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Meritocratic Representation
Philip Pettit
No individual or body can count as the representative of another unless
selected or authorized to act in that role. The representative speaks
and acts in the name of another individual or group, and this, unlike
speaking or acting on another’s behalf – say, speaking or acting as a self-
appointed advocate – requires authorization in the role. This autho-
rization raises two questions. First, is it legitimate? Is the representative
selected by a suitable agent or agency and under suitable rules? Second,
is it motivated? Is the selection made on the grounds that the candidate
is distinctively eligible or qualified for a representative role?
Under electoral arrangements, authorization comes via the selection
of the representative, directly or indirectly, on the basis of a popular
vote. And it is the disposition to be responsive to the attitudes of elec-
tors, which that very mode of selection is designed to encourage, that
qualifies the candidate to serve in a representative role.1 The candidate
or deputy may be responsive at only a general level to the attitudes of
electors – say, to their values or interests – or responsive to detailed
wishes and instructions; in the first case, such a deputy will count as a
trustee, in the second as a delegate.2
Suppose, however, that certain individuals are selected for public
office on the basis of their merit: their professional and related creden-
tials. Assuming that the mode of selection is legitimate – assuming, in
effect, that there is no ground for complaining about the procedure of
appointment – the question is whether it could count as conferring a
representative status on them. Is there anything about such meritocrat-
ically selected personnel that might give us reason to think of them
as representatives of the people rather than independent experts? Is
there any ground for taking them to have popular authority, not just
the authority of Weber’s legal-rational administrators?
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This question has practical significance. Suppose we think that mer-
itocrats, no matter how suitably appointed, lack any qualifications as
popular representatives. Can we regard the things they do in exercise of
their office as things that are done in the name of the people? We may
be able to take this view if they serve at the bidding of the government
that appoints them and if the government is representative of the peo-
ple, say, because of being popularly elected. But we will not be able to
take this view if they are independent in any significant way from those
who appoint them: if, in effect, they do not serve at the pleasure of
government. And as we shall see, meritocratic appointees are routinely
given such independence; the nature of their office requires it. Thus
if we cannot make out a case for such officials having representative
qualifications, we will have to think of them as playing a role that is
hard to reconcile with any notion of popular control of government.
I argue in this chapter that meritocratic selection is consistent
with representative standing, looking in particular at meritocratic
appointments within an electoral democracy. In the first section, I
introduce a distinction between two different sorts of representation,
which I describe respectively as responsive representation and indicative
representation.3 In the second section, I show that the distinction is
implicitly recognized in the traditional political practice of ascribing
representative status to groups that mirror the population as a whole. In
the third section, I show how that there is every reason why individuals
as well as groups might serve as indicative representatives of a popula-
tion. In the fourth, I argue that this gives us reason to think of certain
meritocratically appointed officials and bodies as having the status of
indicative representatives. In the fifth section, I look at the appeal of
such meritocratic representation within an electoral democracy. And
then in a short final section, I mention some problems that, as I see
it, confront the possibility of establishing a credible, legitimate form of
meritocratic representation in the absence of electoral democracy.
The focus of the chapter, it should be noticed, is quite narrow. I am
mainly concerned with whether meritocratic authorities can count as
popular representatives, and I deal with this question out of an interest
in the place they should have in an electoral democracy, drawing on
a wider discussion of the role of democracy elsewhere.4 I begin to join
issue with the case for and against a purely meritocratic regime – a
regime that does not involve many electoral elements – only in the
final section. The remarks I make there serve better as a prologue to
further debate than an epilogue to the debate conducted here.
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I. REPRESENTATION, RESPONSIVE AND INDICATIVE
Imagine that I am invited by my university to take part in a committee –
say, a committee to inquire into how philosophymay bemade as attrac-
tive to female students as tomale. And suppose that I am unable to serve
on the committee myself and that the university authorities, accepting
this, propose to install someone who can serve as my representative on
the committee – someone who can reliably speak for the judgments or
preferences, the principles or the general perspectives, that I am taken
to embody. They want someone who can serve in my place to reflect
the same attitudes, however concrete or abstract, and to speak or act in
a way that is faithful to those attitudes.
In this situation, the authorities may want to have someone on the
committee who will be responsive to my wishes as to how the job
should be done: someone who will serve in effect as my responsive
deputy. In that case, they will look for a representative to whom I can
make my wishes known, however episodically. The authorities may
want to make the representer responsive to more or less constraining
attitudes on my part. They may look for a faithful reflection of the
abstract values, procedural or substantive, that they ascribe to me or for
a reflection of my more concrete views on issues of policy. In either
case, the representer will count as a deputy, but in the first case she will
have the status of a trustee, in the second of a delegate.
But this is not the only way in which I might be represented on the
committee. Instead of seeking to install a responsive deputy, at whatever
level of constraint, the authorities may opt for having someone on the
committee who shares my general attitudes, whether on procedural
or substantive matters, and is likely to vote accordingly. They will not
expect this person to be responsive to me. They may be happy that she
does not knowwhatmy attitudes are or even know that she is nominated
to reflect those attitudes. They will choose her as a representer because
hermentality is indicative ofmy own.Where she is led in her judgments
and decisions, I would be likely to be led, if I were on the committee.
Or so, at any rate, they believe.
This form of representation, like the other variety, would give the
views I am taken to embody a certain impact on the committee’s reflec-
tions and decisions. The representer will not be a responsive deputy,
ready to track what I think, whether on general or particular issues.
But, if the authorities have chosen well, she will be a reliable indicator
of my general attitudes and of where or how I would go on particular
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issues, were I a member of the committee. My attitudes will exercise
influence through her insofar as she is chosen for the prospect that she
will reflect them. We might describe her as an indicative proxy rather
than a responsive deputy.
The essential difference between responsive and indicative represen-
tation is easily stated. In responsive representation, the fact that I am
of a certain mind offers reason for expecting that my deputy will be of
the same mind; after all, she will track what I think at the appropri-
ate level. In indicative representation, things are exactly the other way
around. The fact that my proxy is of a certain mind offers evidence for
expecting that I will be of the same mind; that is what it means for her
to serve as an indicator rather than a tracker. From the point of view of
my being represented on the committee, having someone there who
reflects my mind, it really does not matter whether the representer is a
reliable tracker or indicator. Either figure can give me a presence on
the committee, as we say; either can represent me.
The distinction between responsive and indicative representation
hasn’t been much invoked in the political domain, at least not in the
terms in which I am drawing it. It parallels a distinction in epistemology
between two ways in which my beliefs may be reliable: that is, reliable
representers of the world they depict. They may be reliable trackers of
facts about the world, so that if it is the case that such and such, then
it is likely that I believe that such and such. Or they may be reliable
indicators of worldly facts, so that if I believe that such and such then
it is likely to be the case that such and such.5
Just as beliefs may relate in either way to the facts they purport
to represent epistemically, so representers may relate in either way to
the representees that they purport to represent in a political fashion.
It may be the case that if a representee has such and such attitudes,
at whatever level of grain, then the representer may be expected, in
response, to speak and act on those attitudes. Or it may be the case
that if the representer speaks and acts on certain attitudes, at whatever
level of grain, then given the indicative status of the representer, the
representeemay be assumed to hold those attitudes. In the first case, the
attitudes held by the representee are the causal source of the attitudes
displayed by the representer; in the second, the attitudes displayed
by the representer are an evidential sign of the attitudes held by the
representee. The faithful representer in the first scenario will be reliably
responsive to the representee; the faithful representer in the second will
be reliably indicative of the representee.
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table 5.1
←− Indicative or proxy
Representee attitudes Evidential Representer attitudes representation
−→ Responsive or deputy
Representee attitudes Causal Representer attitudes representation
The two forms of representation are diagramed in Table 5.1.
II. INDICATIVE REPRESENTATION IN TRADITIONAL
AND EXISTING PRACTICE
Three metaphors have dominated the political tradition of thinking
about the meaning of representation, as Quentin Skinner has recently
argued.6 Two of these, associated respectively with the courts and
the theater, answer to the responsive idea of representation. As the
attorney acts under the explicit or implicit direction of a client, so
the idea is that political representers might act as delegated deputies,
under the explicit or implicit direction of their representees. And as
the actor constructively interprets the mind of a character, so the idea
is that representers might serve as trustee deputies in interpreting and
enacting the mind of representees. But the third metaphor identified
by Skinner is drawn from representation in the pictorial arts, and
it maps onto indicative representation. As the painting is indicative
of how the subject of the painting looks, so on this image should
representers be indicative of representees; they should be fitted to serve
as proxies, not – or not just – as deputies.
Although not articulated as such, the idea of indicative represen-
tation figures early in democratic practice, because it is the sort of
representation that is achieved or is likely to be achieved under the
lottery system that was favored by the Athenians and that also played an
important part in later regimes like those of the Italian city republics.7
This lottery system might be taken as a version of the technique of
random sampling, but random sampling put to use in the service of
advancing goals espoused by the people as a whole. Although it may
have been motivated by a desire to have a regular turnover in the rep-
resenter body, the important thing from our viewpoint is that it would
have ensured a degree of proportional and indicative representation.
The indicative idea also appears in the jury system that was developed
inmedieval Europe, although again without being articulated as such.8
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To be subjected to the judgment of one’s peers, whether in determining
that there is a legal case to answer or that one is legally liable, is to be
exposed not to a random arbiter – a chance enemy, perhaps – but to a
body that stands in for the community as a whole. The idea is that the
jurors should represent a cross-section of the community or at least of
the fully enfranchised members: in medieval Europe, the mainstream,
propertied males.9
The indicative image of representation melded with the responsive
image in those writers who argued, from the sixteenth century on,
that the elected, presumptively responsive legislature should also be
an indicatively representative body. The idea is particularly evident
in those parliamentarian writers in England of the mid-seventeenth
century who look for a “speaking likeness” of the people in those who
rule them, “describing Parliament as a ‘representation’ – a picture or
portrait – of the body of the people.”10 Perhaps as a result of that
precedent, it became an established element in the thinking of those
associated with the American War of Independence and the French
Revolution.
Thus, Melanchton Smith could write in 1788, in opposing the
American Constitution: “The idea that naturally suggests itself to our
minds, when we speak of representatives is, that they resemble those
they represent; they should be a true picture of the people.”11 Again,
the idea was powerfully endorsed in a speech given by Mirabeau to the
French Constituent Assembly in 1789, although he used the image of
a map rather than a picture to get it across. According to this version
of the model, “a representative body is to the nation what a chart is for
the physical configuration of its soil: in all its parts, and as a whole, the
representative body should at all times present a reduced picture of
the people – their opinions, aspirations, and wishes, and that presen-
tation should bear the relative proportion to the original precisely as a
map brings before us mountains and dales, rivers and lakes, forests and
plains, cities and towns.”12
The idea of combining an indicative with a responsive form of repre-
sentation gave birth to the proposal, strongly supported by John Stuart
Mill,13 to design the electoral system so as to make the legislature more
and more proportional.14 Is it also behind the practice of organizing
the legislature around geographically dispersed districts? It is hard
to believe that it did not play some role in justifying that practice,
but the evidence appears to be against it.15 Still, districting does
induce a similarity in one dimension – nowadays a fairly unimportant
Trim: 6in × 9in Top: 0.5in Gutter: 0.875in
CUUS2006-05 CUUS2006/Bell ISBN: 978 1 107 03839 4 May 3, 2013 14:47
144 Philip Pettit
one – between the population as a whole and the legislature that
represents it.
The indicative idea survives in the continuing enthusiasm for pro-
portional representation and has been given new life in campaigns for
supplementing electoral representation with novel, statistically repre-
sentative bodies. It is there in the general policy of organizing citizens’
juries that would review various policy issues.16 And it is present in
the notion of the deliberative opinion poll that is chosen as a random
sample and then canvassed for its view on one or another issue at two
separate times: first, before members of the sample make contact with
one another, and, second, after they come together to receive back-
ground information, to hear different points of view, and to debate the
right line to take on the issue under consideration.17
Indicatively representative bodies have been used in many other
contexts too.18 A particularly striking example appears in the Citizens’
Assembly that was recently established in the Canadian province of
British Columbia.19 Amore or less representative sample of 160 citizens
was assembled and given the task, over much of 2004, of reviewing the
existing electoral system in the light of various hearings and discussions
and making a recommendation on whether it should be amended.
The group recommended a change that then went to referendum and
won more about 58 percent support. The recommendation did not
pass, however, because the government had decreed – without much
explanation – that it would need 60 percent support to be put into law.20
III. INDICATIVE REPRESENTATION AT
THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL
The observations in the first section establish that it is conceptually
appropriate to recognize two forms of representative relationship, one
responsive, the other indicative. And the observations in the second
show that political practice, traditional and contemporary, has rec-
ognized the value of indicative as well as responsive representation.
Although the idea of indicative representation has not been a focus of
political thought, it picks up something that has clearly been valued in
past practice. But where discussion in the first section suggested that
an individual might be indicatively represented by another individual,
the political practice described in the second focused entirely on how
one group, an assembly, can be indicatively representative of another:
the population as a whole. And this raises a question as to whether an
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individual as distinct from an assembly might serve in political practice
as the indicative representative of the population.
In the case where a group plays the representative role, it is easy to
see how it might count as indicatively representative of the represented
population. It is composed, say, on the basis of random sampling, in a
manner that ismeant to ensure a suitable similarity or isomorphismwith
the population. Is there a similar basis for claiming that an individual
might be fit to serve as an indicative representative of a population?
There certainly may be in the case where the population to be repre-
sented is characterized by a set of distinctive beliefs or principles, like
a religious congregation or a political movement. A randomly selected
member of the church or association, or at least a member who is well
versed in the group’s commitments, might have obvious qualifications
to serve in an indicative role. But that is a rather special case, and the
question is whether we might identify a basis for treating certain indi-
viduals as fit to serve as indicative representatives of less homogeneous
groups like the typical population of a contemporary state.
To approach this question, it is important to distinguish between
what we may call the compositional and the operational likeness
between an indicative representer and a represented group. The statisti-
cal sample is a compositional likeness of the larger population, and that
is what makes it such an obvious candidate for indicative status. But the
compositional likeness is important only because it promises an opera-
tional likeness. It provides a basis for thinking that if the smaller group
comes to a certain decision in the light of information and discussion,
then it is probable that the population would come to a similar decision
were it able to process information and conduct discussion in the same
way. This is what gives its appeal the idea of an indicatively represen-
tative assembly such as the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly.
The compositional likeness or proportionality between an assembly
of this kind and the population as a whole would be of little or no
significance, however, if it turned out that having been selected for
their isomorphism with the population as a whole, the members of
the sample received monetary rewards from various pressure groups
for taking one or another line. Those special incentives would under-
mine the probability of the sample’s operating as the population would
operate in similar conditions. And so the sample would lose its indica-
tive credentials. What is important for indicative status is operational
similarity and compositional likeness is significant only insofar as it
makes operational more likely.
Trim: 6in × 9in Top: 0.5in Gutter: 0.875in
CUUS2006-05 CUUS2006/Bell ISBN: 978 1 107 03839 4 May 3, 2013 14:47
146 Philip Pettit
This observation teaches an important lesson for the present inquiry,
as we shall see in a moment. But before coming to that lesson it may be
worth remarking that the observation has implications in another area
as well. It suggests that the compositionally indicative legislature sought
under proportional systems will fail to be operationally indicative to the
extent that members are exposed to special electoral incentives. These
will lead them individually and collectively to make decisions, unlike
the decisions of a body like the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly,
that have a diminished claim to reflect how the population as a whole
would decide. In 1810, Benjamin Constant21 already commented on
the likely effect of electoral incentives. “You choose a man to represent
you because he has the same interests as you. By the very fact of your
choosing him, however, your choice of placing him in a different
situation from yours gives him a different interest from the one he is
charged with representing.”
Let us return now to the question of whether any individuals could
be fit to serve as indicative representers of a heterogeneous population.
Suppose that it is operational rather than compositional similarity that
is of importance to indicative status, as our observation suggests. That
implies that even when there is no compositional similarity between
any given individual and a heterogeneous population – unlike the case
with a homogeneous group – it may still be possible for an individual
to be operationally in tune with the population, whether generally or
in a certain range of decision making. If we can find an individual who
displays such an operational attunement, or an individual in whom
such attunement can be elicited, then we will have found someone
who is fit to be invested with an indicatively representative status. I
argue in the next section that those appointed on a meritocratic basis
can display precisely this sort of operational attunement and can indeed
have an indicatively representative status.
IV. INDICATIVE REPRESENTATION AND
MERITOCRACY
In any electoral democracy, those selected by the people to hold office
are bound to appoint a number of other officials in government. Let us
suppose that they appoint them on a meritocratic basis, as distinct from
rewarding electoral supporters; this assumption, which surely applies
in some cases, will make our discussion more straightforward. Some of
the meritocratic appointees will be functionaries who are given the task
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of enacting government will. But others will constitute autonomous
centers of authority, with a tenure in office or terms of appointment
that make them more or less independent of government: they will
serve the community but not, as it used to be said, at the pleasure of
those elected to power.
Meritocratic functionaries cannot have an independent represen-
tative status because they are more or less bound to conform to the
dictates of their masters. Whatever standing they have as representers
of the people, it will be inherited from the responsively representative
standing of the government itself, if indeed the government has such
standing. In this discussion, therefore, I concentrate on the question
of whether meritocratic authorities, as distinct from meritocratic func-
tionaries, can be taken to have the status of popular representatives.
I focus on meritocratic authorities that are characteristic of electoral
democracies, but the argument may also have relevance for the meri-
tocratic authorities that are established in other regimes; I turn to that
issue in the final section.
The authorities I have in mind in electoral democracies can be cast,
broadly, in three categories: contestatory, adjudicative, and executive.
1. Contestatory authorities: those with the duty of raising or relay-
ing complaints and charges against government. They include
the auditor general who can raise questions about government
finances; the attorney general who has the power to charge per-
sonnel in government with malfeasance; ombudsman officials
who can hear and raise complaints about administration; and any
agents who have the task of gauging offences and raising com-
plaints about government breaches of agreed standards or quotas,
say, in the area of diversity or equal opportunity.
2. Adjudicative authorities: those with responsibility for hearing and
often adjudicating such complaints or any complaints in the same
category that are raised directly by members of the public. They
include the judges on the different courts where such charges can
be brought as well as the members of any tribunals or hearings
that are given suitable powers of adjudication.
3. Executive authorities: those who are charged with duties of a kind
for which elected authorities are often deemed unsuitable, having
electoral or other special incentives that would create conflicts of
interest. These include election commissioners who draw district
boundaries; central bankers who determine money supply and
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interest rates; sentencing commissioners who give advice on how
effective penal sanctions are in deterring crime; statisticians who
conduct a periodic census, release seasonal data on the economy,
and report on other sensitive matters like crime rates; and experts
such as those who grant patents, oversee drug trials and provide
checks on food production.
I believe that such meritocratic authorities can reasonably be cast as
indicative representatives of the people. They are appointed to public
office on such a basis, under such constraints, and with such a brief,
that their dispositions to decide matters within their purview are likely
to be indicative of how the people want such decisions to be made.
The authorities listed, unlike elected legislative and administrative
authorities, are each confined to resolving matters in a well-defined
domain. And in that domain the criteria by reference to which people
in general want those decisions to be made are pretty clear. Think
about what we, the members of the public, are going to want insofar
as we accept that we are required to live on equal terms with one
another and not seek special privileges for ourselves. We will want
complaints and charges to be laid against members of the government
in any area where there is a question of a failure of even-handedness or
a breach of conventional or constitutional guidelines. We will want the
adjudication of such charges to be conducted in an impartial manner
with reference to established laws and related expectations. And we
will want the duties given to executive authorities to be discharged in
accordance with salient benchmarks.
The benchmarks towhichwewill hold executive authorities are read-
ily illustrated. Electoral boundaries should facilitate party competition
without damping the influence of anyminority. Interest rates should be
set at a level that keeps the long-term as well as the short-term in view.
Sentencing commissioners should keep track of the deterrent effect, if
any, of otherwise costly and punitive measures. Those in charge of the
release and analysis of data should be accurate in the basic information
supplied and nonpartisan in the spin that it is given. Those responsible
for food and drug administration should make their judgments and
impose their resolutions on the basis of impartial assessment without
regard to the claims of special interests.
It is important that the criteria at which I gesture in these contestatory,
adjudicative, and executive areas are endorsed in the population at
large. It is only if they have this endorsement that imposing them on
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public authorities can count as imposing a form of popular control on
those individuals and bodies. But I think it is overwhelmingly plausible
in most advanced societies today that the people do endorse such
criteria. If you have any doubts about that claim, ask yourself whether
the breach of such benchmarks would be likely to cause a scandal, and
provoke outrage, if it became a matter of public knowledge. Clearly the
answer is that it would. Can you imagine any informed population –
or at least any that is not intimidated by fear of reprisal – remaining
quiet and resigned in face of information about government corruption,
judicial favoritism, or failures of impartiality in the performance of
various executive authorities?
Let it be granted, then, that there are popularly endorsed criteria,
recognized on all sides, to which public, unelected authorities ought
to be answerable. The next question is whether such authorities can
be led by suitable constraints to abide by such criteria, thereby acting
in a way that is indicative of how the people would want them to act. I
believe that they can.
Suppose that meritocratic authorities are appointed on the basis of
their professional skills and standing or, where that is irrelevant, their
presumptive detachment and impartiality. Suppose that they are subject
to public comment and censure and, like elected authorities, to the
possibility of being charged and punished for misconduct. And suppose
that they are given clear briefs to implement, and clear benchmarks that
they are expected tomeet. If these assumptions hold, as they ought to do
under most images of the well-functioning polity, then the factors they
put in place will combine to ensure that meritocratic authorities live
up to the standards or criteria supported by the public. Let meritocratic
authorities fail to meet such standards, and the constraints described
should ensure that they are exposed to public gaze, subjected to public
shame, and punished according to the law. Faced with the prospect
of such sanctions for malfeasance or even underperformance, we can
reasonably suppose that they will live up in general to the standards
that the public expects them to meet.
The sanctions of public shame and legal punishment may vary in
importance across cultures, but I note that inmany societies, the penalty
of public shame – and the reward of public acclaim – may be particu-
larly important. The professionals who may be expected to hold many
meritocratic offices will generally subscribe to professional standards of
performance and ought to be susceptible to powerful incentives of pro-
fessional and indeed public esteem.22 Such incentives will lead them to
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shirk the disgrace and penalty associated with being indicted for under-
performance or misconduct, and it will provide a motive for avoiding
laziness or apathy by holding out the prospect of honor and status. Or
at least we may expect that this will be so insofar as the authorities are
not bound by partisan ties. Otherwise they may be prone to the temp-
tation to seek standing, not in their profession or community at large,
but in the political party to which they belong. David Hume articu-
lated this danger with characteristic edge.23 “Honour is a great check
upon mankind: But where a considerable body of men act together,
this check is, in a great measure, removed; since a man is sure to be
approved of by his own party, for what promotes the common inter-
est [of the party]; and he soon learns to despise the clamours of his
adversaries.”
And so to the denouement. If meritocratic authorities are suitably
appointed, constrained, and briefed so that they are subject to suitable
sanctions and incentives, then there is every reason to expect that their
attitudes will be indicative of the attitudes, on matters within their
domain, of the population in general. Members of the public will want
decisions in that domain to be taken according to the sorts of criteria
listed earlier. And the basis on which the authorities are appointed, the
constraints to which they are subject, and the briefs that they are given
ought to combine to support a concern to live up to those standards.
V. THE ATTRACTIONS OF MERITOCRATIC
REPRESENTATION WITHIN ELECTORAL
DEMOCRACY
The argument so far suggests that if the conditions of appointment and
performance are suitable – as, plausibly, they can be made to be – then
the sorts of meritocratic authorities that figure in electoral democracies
will count as indicative representatives of the people. It may be useful
now to add a few remarks on the more obvious advantages of such
representation in an electoral democracy.
The most obvious point to make in support of meritocratic, indica-
tive representatives is that they promise to do a lot better in the sorts
of offices envisaged than elected, responsive representatives would
do.24 If contestatory authorities had to seek election, then they would
have an incentive to adopt policies in line with majority opinion and,
ignoring the rationale for their existence, to neglect minority com-
plaints. If adjudicative authorities had to seek election, then again they
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would often have incentives to appeal to passing, popular sentiment,
and the concerns of those who help them attain office, rather than to
the strict requirements of the law. And if the various executive author-
ities listed were subject to electoral pressures, then in most cases, they
would be tempted to neglect the benchmarks that ought by all accounts
to guide their performance. Electoral commissioners would be pressed
to favor the party that supports them in drawing constituency bound-
aries; central bankers would be motivated to appeal to supporters by
promising congenial short-term policies; and of course any officials in
charge of presenting or analyzing data would have an incentive to tailor
things to the party or group on which they rely for election.
These considerations not only suggest that meritocratic authorities
ought not to be elected but also that such officials ought indeed to
be independent of those elected to office. They argue that democracy
cannot rely on just the responsive credentials that elected representa-
tives enjoy; it cannot live by election alone. Any government where
things are reliably done in a manner that answers to the presumptive
and legitimate expectations of the people must embody meritocratic
representation.
There is a powerful tradition of thinking that the power enjoyed
by meritocratic authorities represents a constraint on the power of the
people and that it is essentially antidemocratic.25 It is precisely because
of opposing this tradition that I want to argue that such authorities
can claim the status of popular representatives, indicative rather than
responsive in character. The idea is that meritocratic authorities are
not a means through which the people are thwarted but rather an
essential part of the means through which the power of the people over
government – this, rather than the power of a majority or indeed an
elite – is most reliably ensured. Like elected authorities, they can claim
in their area of expertise to speak and act in the people’s name.
The category of indicative representative is not invented just for
the purpose of supporting this claim about meritocratic authorities.
As we saw, it applies equally with certain representative bodies. And,
to add one further consideration, it is also required to make sense of
the status of private individuals or movements that challenge govern-
ment with underperformance or malfeasance in public forums and
serve what by all accounts is a democratically important, contestatory
role. These figures include the whistleblowers and complainants who
expose abuses in public life or the individual citizens or watchdog bod-
ies or nongovernmental organizations that challenge and expose the
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unconstitutional or otherwise questionable character of certain laws or
policies.
What gives such contesting parties – such private attorneys general –
the right to speak,26 as they generally claim to do, in the name of the
people? They are indicative representatives who are subject to such
constraints that they are bound to enact a brief, as we might think of it,
that they are popularly assigned. The brief is provided implicitly in the
fact that an approved constitution or set of conventions allows them to
mount arguments in the courts or other forums against new laws and
other decrees. The rationale behind the brief is to ensure that those in
any potentially disadvantaged sector of society can be represented by
one of their kind, or someone sympathetic to them, in challenging and
testing the measures at issue. And those private attorneys general are
more or less bound to enact their brief, and honor its rationale, by being
required to follow established channels, arguing their case in a publicly
accessible forum on publicly available and contestable grounds.
All of these remarks are designed to underline the acceptability and
the merits of meritocratic representation in electoral democracies. But
is there anything to be said on the other side? Are there dangers in
giving meritocratic authorities the power that I have been envisaging
for them?
The main danger springs from the fact that whereas elected, respon-
sive representers remain subject to popular control, being constantly
exposed to the possibility of being thrown out of office, meritocratic,
indicative representers enjoy a potentially greater autonomy. Once
installed in office, they are there for the duration of their term. Thus
there is a constant danger of their becoming a law unto themselves,
usurping the power of the people. The danger is manifest with the
Supreme Court of the United States, for example, where judges are
nominated by a president in one or another party, they enjoy tenure for
life, and they are subject to few, if any, constraints from without. It is
unsurprising that the judicial review that the Supreme Court practices
has come in for trenchant criticism among political theorists.27
But if the danger of meritocratic authority is salient, so are the safe-
guards required. It is essential that themode of appointment in any area
of meritocratic authority, the constraints under which appointees oper-
ate, and the briefs to which they are bound, guard effectively against
the usurpation of popular power. And because experience is essential
for the testing of how well such safeguards operate, it is essential that
that they can be periodically reviewed and adjusted in the light of
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feedback. The American experience has clearly demonstrated that the
system through which Supreme Court justices are appointed is flawed.
It invites any would-be candidates for office to give themselves a party-
political complexion and appeal, thereby reducing their credibility as
impartial arbiters. And once installed in office, it leaves them there
until their demise or until they voluntarily opt for retirement: it gives
them power unlimited.
VI. THE PROBLEMS WITH MERITOCRATIC
REPRESENTATION WITHOUT
ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY
The need to establish, maintain, and revise the conditions under which
meritocratic authorities operate raises the question of whether we can
expect them to perform satisfactorily outside the context of an electoral
democracy. That question is at the center of current discussion about
political meritocracy, figuring inmany of the other contributions to this
book. I cannot hope to address the various points that have been made
on different sides to that debate, but it may be useful if, in conclusion,
I briefly rehearse some considerations that make a case in my mind for
embedding meritocratic structures within an electoral frame. Just as
meritocratic representation is required to guard against the dangers of
electoral representation, so I believe that electoral is needed to guard
against the dangers of meritocratic.
There are three considerations I would like to put on the table
in support of this view, although I cannot properly expand on any
and cannot register the points that others may make in response. The
first is that it is hard to see how the issues surrounding appropriate
modes of appointment, constraints of office, and official briefs could be
satisfactorily debated and resolved, reopened and adjusted, outside an
electoral context. The possibility of exploring those issues in electoral
challenge, in debates between electorally responsive parties, and in the
individual or group contestation that they invite is clearly useful for
fine-tuning the requirements on meritocratic representatives. Could
such fine-tuning be accomplished on a popularly supported basis – and
credibly accomplished on such a basis – in the absence of a nonelectoral
dispensation? Myself I doubt it, although I expect that debate will
continue on that question.
The second consideration that moves me to think that merito-
cratic representation needs to be supported by electoral is that elected,
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responsive representatives can themselves play an important role in
contesting and checking the activities of meritocratic authorities. They
can demand with effect that such authorities should properly explain
certain judgments and decisions. And short of appearing to challenge
the very regime under which such authorities exist, they cannot merely
invoke party-political interest in making their demands. They will have
to appeal to criteria of performance that are likely to be accepted as
relevant benchmarks in the community as a whole. This considera-
tion is no more conclusive than the first, because other bodies might
serve a similar role: for example, the institution of Confucian intellec-
tuals proposed by Jiang Qing.28 But still it seems to me to carry some
considerable weight.
The third consideration that I take to favor embedding meritocratic
representation in an electoral context involves the notion of legitimacy
and takes us back to an observation made at the beginning of the
chapter. The authorization of individuals in a representative role, so
we saw, raises two questions. First, the issue of whether the selectionwas
made legitimately: that is, by a suitable agency, operating under suitable
rules. And second, the issue of whether it was suitably motivated, being
grounded in the eligibility for a representative role of the candidates
selected. We have seen that representative eligibility may consist in the
responsive or indicative status, existing or expected, of those candidates.
Butwhat is needed to establish the legitimacywithwhich the candidates
are put in representative office? I suggest that electoral democracy may
have to play an indispensable part.
This issue of legitimacy takes us into deep waters and Imust deal with
it in too brief a compass. Government authorities impose coercively on
people, in the nature of the case. And so, in looking at such authorities,
we may not only ask about how well they perform in office, by whatever
criterion of performance is supposed, but also about whether they have
a legitimate claim to office that trumps that of others. A legitimate claim
to officewould entitle them to our acceptance, evenwhen things are not
going so well. It is important that authorities have such a claim because
otherwise every downturn in the country’s fortunes would argue, other
things being equal, for revolution and regime change.
Authorities who are elected under a periodic, competitive, egalitarian
system of election – and actual democracies often fail to satisfy such
conditions properly – have a good claim to be legitimate officeholders.
And unelected authorities who are appointed by those so elected, under
an open, contestable system of appointment, have an equally good
claim to hold office legitimately. But how is legitimacy going to be
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established in the absence of election? In particular, how is it going to
be established for unelected figures like the meritocratic authorities on
whom we have been focusing here?
The meritocratic philosophy, developed in different ways in other
contributions to this book, has an answer to that question. The core
claim, as I understand it, is that legitimacy is going to be established
under broadly two conditions: first, that those in office are meritorious
in a relevant way – suitably talented and virtuous; and second, that
they are selected over others on the basis of that merit. But I see two
problems with that proposal as a theory of legitimacy, and I conclude
with a brief mention of these.
The first problem is that it is hard to see what feasible system of
selection might pass muster as reliably meritocratic: reliably capable of
selecting the talented and the virtuous. The ancient system of exami-
nations to the mandarinate may have worked well as a way of selecting
the talented and it could presumably be resurrected in today’s world.
But could any such impersonal system be relied on to select for virtue
as well as talent? I don’t see how it could. That suggests that we have to
rely on a system that leaves room for more personal assessments of the
candidates. Any such system, however, would have to depend on inter-
views and testimonials and, ultimately, personal relationships. And it is
hard to see how it could command the credence of the population at
large, convincing them that it operates without bias or favor. Theremay
be cultural differences in this respect between East and West, as some
have suggested, arguing that credence is more readily forthcoming in
the East. But, without being an expert on such cultural matters, I am
not convinced that they are as deep as they would have to be to settle
my concerns.
The second problem that I see with the antielectoral meritocratic
proposal relates to the claim of those actually selected to be truly meri-
torious. If a system establishes the legitimacy of officeholders, it ought to
establish their legitimacy even in the event that they do not apparently
do so well in office: even in the event, for example, that the economy
takes a downturn. An economic downturn in an electoral democracy
would not necessarily jeopardize the claim of the authorities to legiti-
macy; it would put a question over their abilities and efforts instead. But
a downturn in a pure meritocracy would surely suggest to many that
those in office are not actually meritorious – not suitably talented or
not suitably virtuous – and would therefore raise a question about their
legitimate claims to office. I think that it is important that legitimacy
should not be tied in this way to performance, because it is required to
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motivate popular acceptance of those in office, regardless of how well
or badly they actually perform. On this front I am not convinced that
the meritocratic philosophy offers a satisfactory account of legitimacy.
The main argument of this chapter has been that not all those who
can legitimately claim to represent us need to be elected. But it may
still be the case, as these final remarks suggest, that some of our repre-
sentatives have to be elected if those who aren’t elected can credibly
claim to be legitimate representatives. These last remarks are all too
brief, however, and open up a new discussion at the same time that
they close down the discussion pursued here.29
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